Case Studies | Alitheon® FeaturePrint®

Customer identities withheld. These deployments are described with the customers anonymized at their request and under the terms of non-disclosure agreements. The problems, the approaches and the outcomes are as they occurred. No customer performance figures are published.

1 / 7 · Healthcare & Personal Care · Product diversion

How a Global Skincare Brand Stopped Diversion in Its Authorized Channel

A global skincare brand was losing control of its authorized distribution. Genuine product intended for one channel was appearing at unauthorized sellers, and because the goods were real, no authenticity test flagged them. FeaturePrint gave each unit an identity taken from its own surface, so the brand could establish which specific units had left the authorized path and where they left it.

Key results

Individual units identified at unauthorized sellers, not just the production lots they came from
The point of departure from the authorized channel established from the units themselves
No change to the product, its packaging or the production line

The challenge

The brand knew it had a diversion problem and could not prove where it started. Genuine product was surfacing through sellers it had never authorized, at prices that undercut the partners who played by the rules.

Every investigation ran into the same wall. The goods were authentic, so authenticity was not the question. The question was which units these were and how they got there, and nothing in the existing system could answer it.

Why the existing controls could not answer it

The brand had batch and lot coding, as most manufacturers do. That identifies a production run, not a unit.

A batch code covers thousands of units, so it narrows the source to a run rather than a shipment.
Channel information printed on outer packaging is removed or discarded before resale.
A diverter has every incentive to strip or obscure anything that links a unit to its intended destination.
Purchase records show what was shipped to whom, not what actually surfaced where.

What changed

Each unit was enrolled at manufacture from a photograph of its own surface, and that identity was recorded against its authorized destination and channel. Nothing was added to the product or the packaging.

When units were acquired from unauthorized sellers, a photograph was enough to establish which specific units they were. Because each identity was tied to an intended destination, the brand could work backwards from the recovered goods to the point where they left the authorized path.

Why it worked where labels had not

The identity a diverter would need to remove is the product's own surface. There is nothing to peel off, reprint or discard, so the link between a unit and its intended destination survives everything that happens to the packaging.

Authentication returns a result with zero false positives, so a confirmed unit is confirmed — the finding held up in conversations with channel partners rather than becoming a dispute about method.

The same enrolled identity that exposed the diversion also authenticates the product at retail and in the secondary market, using the same photograph and the same workflow.

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2 / 7 · Healthcare & Personal Care · Expired stock relabeling

How a Distributor Caught Expired Product Relabeled With Extended Dates

Product that had passed its expiry date was being relabeled with extended dates and sold on. Every printed control on the package agreed with the fraud, because the fraud was the printing. FeaturePrint identified each unit from its own surface, which still matched the original enrollment and its true production record — regardless of what the new label said.

Key results

Relabeled units traced back to their original enrollment and true production record
Detection independent of anything printed on the package
Suspect stock identified from photographs, with no laboratory testing

The challenge

Expired stock was re-entering the market with fresh labels showing later dates. To anyone inspecting the package, the product was in date. The label said so, and the label was new and clean.

This is a harder problem than counterfeiting. The product inside is the real product, made by the real manufacturer. Only one fact about it has been falsified, and that fact lives entirely on a printed surface that has been replaced.

Why printed controls could not catch it

Every conventional control for expiry is printed, which means relabeling defeats all of them at once.

The expiry date is printed, so a new label carries a new date.
Barcodes and serials are printed, so they are reprinted along with it.
Tamper-evident features protect the contents, not the accuracy of the date on the outside.
Once the original label is gone, nothing on the package contradicts the new one.

What changed

Each unit was enrolled at manufacture from its own surface, and that identity was recorded alongside its genuine production and expiry information. The identity is physical and the record is held separately from the package.

When a suspect unit was photographed, it matched an enrollment that carried the real dates. The relabeling had changed what the package claimed; it had not changed the item, and the item is what FeaturePrint reads.

Why this case matters beyond one distributor

Serialization programs are built on the assumption that the identifier and the product stay together and stay honest. Relabeling breaks that assumption without breaking any of the controls that enforce it.

An identity taken from the item's own surface is not vulnerable to relabeling, because relabeling does not touch it. Whatever is printed on the outside, the unit still answers to the record it was enrolled against.

The same approach supports DSCSA, FDA UDI and EU Falsified Medicines Directive programs, with the physical item rather than its packaging as the anchor.

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3 / 7 · Electronics & Datacenters · Hardware integrity and asset tracking

How a Datacenter Operator Streamlined Inventory and Kept Fraudulent Boards Out of Its Racks

A datacenter operator was running two separate processes against the same hardware — an asset tracking system based on applied tags, and a largely procedural defense against boards of uncertain origin. FeaturePrint collapsed both into one step. A photograph taken at receiving identifies the specific board and confirms it is the one that was enrolled at the authorized source, before it goes into a rack.

Key results

Inventory record and authenticity check produced by the same action
Boards that do not match an enrollment identified before rack installation
Zero-trust verification extended from software to the physical hardware it runs on

The challenge

The operator verified software continuously and trusted hardware on arrival. Boards were accepted because the shipment matched the purchase order and the asset tag matched the spreadsheet.

Asset tracking was its own burden: applied tags, manual reconciliation, and periodic audits that consumed staff time and still produced records that drifted from what was physically in the racks.

Why tags could not close either gap

An applied tag is a claim about an object, made by whoever applied it.

Asset tags and serial stickers can be moved between boards, deliberately or by mistake.
A substituted board carries whatever sticker was put on it and reconciles cleanly.
Purchase orders and packing lists describe what was ordered, not what arrived.
Electrical or destructive testing cannot be applied to production hardware at volume.

What changed

Boards were enrolled at the authorized source, each from a photograph of its own surface. At receiving, a second photograph identified the specific board and confirmed it against that enrollment.

One action now produces both outputs. The asset record is created from the board itself rather than from a tag applied to it, and a board that does not match an enrollment is identified before it reaches a rack.

Zero trust, applied to physical things

Zero Trust architecture holds that nothing is trusted by default and everything is verified. The operator had applied that rigorously to software and, like most organizations, not at all to the hardware underneath it.

Alitheon calls the extension Zero Trust for Things: a component is trusted because it has been verified against its own recorded identity, not because its markings, its paperwork or its supplier look right. Verification is a photograph, which is what makes it practical at rack scale.

Because verification needs only a standard camera, the check happens at receiving and staging by the people already handling the hardware, rather than at a dedicated inspection step.

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4 / 7 · Collectibles & Luxury · Return fraud

How a Collectibles Marketplace Stopped Return Fraud on High-Value Items

A marketplace handling high-value collectibles was absorbing losses from return fraud: a buyer receives a genuine item, returns a substitute, and keeps the original. Disputes came down to one party's word against another's. FeaturePrint enrolled each item before shipment, so a photograph of the returned item settles whether it is the item that was sent.

Key results

Returned items confirmed as the exact item shipped, or confirmed as not
Return disputes resolved on physical evidence rather than on assertion
No slab, sticker or tag added to items where any modification destroys value

The challenge

In high-value collectibles, the return window is the attack surface. A buyer receives the genuine article, sends back something that resembles it closely enough to pass a visual check, and keeps what they were sent.

The marketplace sat in the middle with no way to adjudicate. Refusing a return risked a legitimate customer and a public complaint. Accepting it risked absorbing the loss. Most of the time the outcome was decided by which party argued more convincingly.

Why the usual protections did not settle it

Collectibles are the hardest category for conventional identification, because the things that make an item valuable are the things you must not alter.

Listing photographs show what the item looked like, not that this is that item.
Serial numbers, where they exist, are shared across many identical units.
Graded holders can be opened, resealed or swapped.
Applying a tag, sticker or mark to a collectible damages the value being protected.

What changed

Each item was enrolled before shipment from a photograph of its own surface. Nothing was applied to it and nothing about it was altered, which matters in a category where a sticker is a defect.

When an item came back, a photograph at receiving confirmed whether it was the item that had been sent. The question stopped being a matter of judgment and became a matter of record.

What that changed commercially

The marketplace could decline fraudulent returns with evidence rather than suspicion, and could accept legitimate ones without hesitation, which are two halves of the same improvement.

The same enrollment carries forward. An item authenticated on return can be authenticated again at its next sale, so each item accumulates a verifiable history rather than starting over with every transaction.

The same identity supports authentication at resale, which is the recurring problem in any secondary market for high-value goods.

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5 / 7 · Precious Metals · Provenance without proxies

How a Refinery Proved Gold Provenance From Doré Bar to Minted Bar

A refinery needed to prove to vaults and banks that its gold came from its own legitimate supply chain, at every stage of transformation. Stamps and certificates can be forged or paired with the wrong bar. FeaturePrint enrolled each bar from its own surface at each stage, so the downstream holder verifies the metal in front of them rather than the paperwork travelling with it.

Key results

Each bar verifiable from its own surface at doré, refined and finished stages
Vaults and banks able to confirm a bar without relying on stamps, seals or certificates
Chain of custody anchored to the metal rather than to accompanying documents

The challenge

Gold arrives as doré, is refined, and leaves as finished or minted bars. At each step the metal changes form, and the identity assigned to it has to be re-established.

The refinery's customers — vaults and banks — need certainty that what they are holding came from a legitimate, documented supply chain. That certainty was carried entirely by stamps and paperwork, both of which travel alongside the metal rather than being part of it.

Why stamps and certificates leave a gap

Every conventional control in the precious metals chain is a proxy: a mark applied to the bar, or a document describing it.

Serial stamps and hallmarks can be reproduced by anyone with the equipment to apply them.
An assay certificate describes a bar; it does not prove it belongs to the bar it arrives with.
Documents can be transferred to different metal without anything about the metal objecting.
Once a bar is re-poured or re-minted, any mark applied to the previous form is gone.

What changed

Each bar was enrolled from a photograph of its own surface — the pour marks, texture and micro-irregularities that are unique to that individual bar and that no two castings share.

Because refining and minting change the object, bars were re-enrolled at each transformation, with the new identity linked to the previous one. The result is a chain in which each stage is anchored to the physical metal rather than to a mark applied to it.

What the downstream holder gets

A vault or bank receiving a bar can verify it from a photograph, against the refinery's enrollment, without trusting a stamp, a seal or a document that arrived in the same shipment.

That distinction matters most in exactly the cases where it is hardest to establish: where the paperwork is the thing that has been falsified. The bar's own surface does not come with the paperwork and cannot be issued by whoever issued it.

Why it suits precious metals specifically

Nothing is added to the metal. No drilling, no embedded tag, no applied marking — which matters where any inclusion is a contaminant and any modification affects value and assay.

Verification needs only a standard camera, so a vault, a bank or a customs officer can perform it without specialist equipment or destructive sampling.

The same enrollment supports responsible sourcing programs, where the requirement is to demonstrate that specific metal came from a specific documented origin rather than that a shipment matches a paperwork trail.

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6 / 7 · Government & Military · Inventory accountability

How a Military Logistics Operation Cut the Cost of Inventory Accountability

A military logistics operation was spending substantial personnel time on recurring inventory and accountability, work that depended on reading markings that wear, corrode or become unreadable. FeaturePrint identifies each item from a photograph of its own surface. Fewer people complete a pass faster, without the misidentification that manual reading of degraded markings produces.

Key results

Inventory passes completed by fewer personnel in less time
Misidentification from worn, damaged or unreadable markings removed from the process
Accountability records that reflect the physical items rather than the legibility of their marks

The challenge

Inventory and accountability are recurring, mandatory and manual. Personnel read markings, match them against records, and resolve the discrepancies that reading degraded markings inevitably produces.

The cost is not only the hours spent. It is the hours spent twice — on the pass, and then on reconciling what the pass turned up. Every unreadable mark becomes an exception, and every exception becomes someone's afternoon.

Why marked identification does not fully solve it

IUID under MIL-STD-130 requires permanent unique identification of property, conventionally by physical marking. The requirement is sound; the medium is fragile.

Etchings and labels wear, corrode and are damaged in field and depot conditions.
An unreadable mark turns an item into a manual investigation.
A marking applied to an item can be removed and applied to a different one.
Some items cannot be marked at all without compromising them.

What changed

Items were enrolled from photographs of their own surfaces. Nothing was etched, labeled or attached, so nothing degrades between one inventory and the next.

A pass became a sequence of photographs taken with equipment personnel already carry. FeaturePrint requires no new hardware and operates as a camera service and mobile application over existing workflows, so the process changed without the surrounding system changing.

The effect beyond the inventory itself

Reducing the people and time a pass consumes is the visible saving. The larger one is what stops happening downstream.

Exceptions that previously required investigation do not arise, because identification does not depend on a mark being legible. Records reflect what is physically present rather than what could be read, which means readiness reporting built on those records is built on something firmer. Personnel released from reconciliation return to the work they were assigned to do.

FeaturePrint supports IUID requirements under MIL-STD-130 without labels, etchings or markings, so the accountability obligation is met by an identity that cannot wear off.

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7 / 7 · Government & Military · Counterfeit parts

How a Defense Supply Chain Stopped Counterfeit Parts Before Installation

A defense supply chain was relying on certifications, approved suppliers and markings to keep fraudulent parts out — controls that describe the channel rather than the component that actually arrived. FeaturePrint authenticates each part against its own enrolled surface before acceptance, so a part that is not the enrolled part does not enter the chain.

Key results

Parts verified individually before acceptance, not sampled after the fact
Detection independent of markings, certifications and supplier paperwork
Logged, timestamped authentication records supporting DFARS 252.246-7007

The challenge

Fraudulent parts in a defense supply chain are a national security problem before they are a procurement problem. A part that fails in service can cost a mission, a platform or a life, and the failure may occur long after the paperwork was filed and accepted.

The chain already had controls. Approved supplier lists, certifications of conformance, incoming inspection. Parts were getting through anyway.

Why the existing controls were not enough

Each control verifies something adjacent to the question. None of them verifies the object.

An approved-supplier list confirms who the order was placed with, not what was delivered.
A certificate of conformance can be forged as readily as the part it accompanies.
Markings are exactly what a competent counterfeiter reproduces first.
Visual inspection is defeated by fraudulent re-marking, and no supplier list, visual inspection or X-ray achieves zero false positives.

What changed

Parts were enrolled at the authorized source from photographs of their own surfaces. At incoming acceptance, a second photograph confirmed each part against its enrollment.

A part that does not match an enrollment is identified at that point — before acceptance, before stock, before installation. The check does not depend on the part's markings, its documentation or the reputation of the supplier who sent it.

Why verification has to sit at the item

Every control that can be forged alongside the part is a control that a sufficiently motivated adversary has already priced in. Paperwork, markings and certifications all travel with the shipment and can be produced by whoever produced the shipment.

A component's own surface cannot be issued, reprinted or transferred. That is what makes it usable as the basis for trust in a chain where an adversary is assumed to be trying, which is the working assumption in defense.

Records as a by-product

Every authentication is logged and timestamped against the item's identity. The audit trail supporting DFARS 252.246-7007 is produced by the act of checking rather than assembled separately for the auditor.

The same enrolled identity supports traceability through depot storage, installation, field use, maintenance and disposition — the whole life of the part, not only its acceptance.

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